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THIRD-PARTY CONSENT SEARCHES:
SOME NECESSARY SAFEGUARDS
GARY K. MATTHEWS*
INTRODUCTION
Police arrest Jones and place him in a police car in front
of the house where he resides. The police then ask Smith,
who shares the residence with Jones, if they may search
the premises. Smith consents to the warrantless search
and evidence is found that incriminates Jones. Although
he was available at the time of the search, Jones' con-
sent was never sought.
A certain amount of confusion has always surrounded the
fourth amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches and
seizures.' While the language of that amendment is far from
clear, a number of general statements defining what the fourth
amendment does and does not say may be made. It does say that
all people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;' that all war-
rants, to be valid, must be based upon probable cause ;3 and that
certain requirements must be met before a search warrant may
be issued, i.e., facts establishing probable cause must be supported
by oath or affirmation and describe with particularity" the place
to be searched and the person or things' to be seized.
*J.D., Valparaiso University School of Law, 1975.
1. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1966). See, e.g.,
Christopher, A New Rule in Searches and Seizures, 1 ALA. L. REuv. 49
(1948); Franklin, Full Search Incident to a Lawful Custodial Arrest for
a Traffic Violation-The Deterioration of Fourth Amendment Guarantees
Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 18 How. L.J. 446 (1974).
2.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963).
4. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965) (Fortas, J., dissent-
ing).
5. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
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The fourth amendment does not, however, require a warrant
for all searches.6 A warrantless search is permissible as long as
it is reasonable under the circumstances Nor does the fourth
amendment say that for a search to be reasonable it must be
based upon probable cause.' While the general rule is that a
search warrant is necessary for a valid search and subsequent
seizure of items as evidence, it is also clear, based on the wording
and judicial interpretation of this amendment, that there may be
constitutional searches which are warrantless, or done without
probable cause, or both.' These latter searches are exceptions to
the general rule. Circumstances under which they can arise in-
clude searches of a vehicle upon probable cause, for the fruits or
instrumentalities of a crime; 'o searches incident to a valid arrest
and limited in scope to the area within the immediate control of
the arrested party;" and searches conducted pursuant to the con-
sent of the party searched.' 2
The general focus of this article centers on the last of the
above exceptions, the consent search. Specifically, the search made
pursuant to consent given by a third party, one not the ultimate
defendant, will be given particular attention. The third-party re-
lationship involved in such searches arises from a husband-wife
or intrafamilial relationship, a joint-tenancy situation, or various
other settings involving co-occupancy of premises or effects. The
purpose of this article is twofold. First, it is to demonstrate how
the access and control test presently used by the Court to validate
third-party consent searches inadequately protects fourth amend-
ment rights to privacy. Secondly, and more importantly, the pur-
pose of this article is to suggest a workable means to safeguard
fourth amendment rights without significantly handicapping ef-
fective law enforcement techniques. To facilitate this end, it is
6. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
7. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1966), where the
Court describes warrantless searches that have been validated because they
were reasonable.
8. The wording of the fourth amendment says only that the standard
for issuing warrants is probable cause. Where no warrant is issued, and
the search is reasonable, it may still be valid though done without a probable
cause. See note 9 infra.
9. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1974) (consent searches
require neither probable cause nor search warrant).
10. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) ; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
11. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
12. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970); Davis v. United States, 328
U.S. 582 (1946); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 642 (1946).
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THIRD-PARTY CONSENT SEARCHES
helpful to begin with a brief examination of past methods used
by courts to validate consent searches, and to show how these
methods have proved unsatisfactory.
DEVELOPMENT OF THIRD-PARTY CONSENT TESTS
Until 1974, the Supreme Court had never directly dealt with
the question of searches made pursuant to consent given by one
other than the person suspected of the crime. 3 As a result, lower
courts struggled with this problem' 4 and posed a number of solu-
tions to it. Among the first of these solutions to develop was the
agency, or apparent authority test.15 Under the rationale of this
test, the ultimate defendant had acted either directly or indirectly
to appoint a third party as his agent. As a result, the ultimate
defendant was held to have authorized the waiver of his fourth
amendment right to privacy by the creation of the agency rela-
tionship and the subsequent consent to the search by the agent.
Under the agency or apparent authority test, the third party
(agent) could consent to a search on behalf of the ultimate de-
fendant (principal). For example, if Jones agreed to let Smith
have the use of his house, the law would imply that Smith was
acting as Jones' agent with respect to matters concerning the
house. As such, Smith could act on behalf of his principal and
could consent to a search of the premises that was aimed at Jones.
The agency theory may be an adequate means to validate
third-party consent searches in situations where goods have been
bailed, or where an express agency relationship can otherwise be
shown;' 6 but generally, it is unsatisfactory for two important
reasons. First, the agency relationship in the majority of cases
13. In Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921), the question was
raised as to whether a wife could waive her husband's fourth amendment
rights and consent to a search on the basis of the husband-wife relationship
alone. Deciding the case on other grounds, the Court did not reach that
issue.
14. See Bender, Third Party Consent to Search and Seizure: A Request
for Reevaluation, 4 CRIM. L. BuLL. 343, 344-46 (1968).
15. Berner, Search and Seizure: Status and Methodology, 8 VAL. U.L.
REv. 471, 548 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Berner].
16. In United States v. Eldridge, 302 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1962), the de-
fendant gratuitously bailed his automobile to a friend who subsequently con-
sented to a search of its trunk. The search was held valid because the bail-
ment relationship implied that the person in possession of the vehicle could do
"whatever was reasonable and not inconsistent with its entrustment to him,"
id. at 446, and also because the search was aimed at the consenting party
and not the ultimate defendant.
19761
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is obviously based on a fiction."' Second, the test is difficult to
apply because it suggests no natural guidelines for its application.'
A second solution to the problem of third-party consent
searches involves the more recent "assumption of risk" test."
Whether the suspect has an actual and reasonable expectation
of privacy is the basic question under this test. If such an ex-
pectation does not exist the third-party consent search is valid.
If, on the other hand, the expectation of privacy can be shown
by all the circumstances, either a warrant or the property owner's
personal consent to have his property searched must be obtained.
For example, Jones gives the use of his house to Smith on the
condition that Smith not use the basement, which is locked and
for which only Jones has the key. Applying the assumption of
risk test, Smith could not consent to a search of the basement
because Jones had specifically restricted the use of it from Smith,
thus demonstrating. his expectation of privacy concerning that
area of the house. However, Smith could consent to a search of
the rest of the house since Jones demonstrated no expectation of
privacy for any area other than the basement.
Whether the agency test, the assumption of risk test, or
other tests are still valid legal theories is now uncertain. The
Supreme Court, in the recent case of United States v. Matlock,2 '
supports a test which considers only the co-occupants' access and
control over the premises and effects sought to be searched. Since
the Court in Matlock neither overruled nor mentioned any of the
other tests relative to third-party searches fashioned by the lower
courts, the futures of those tests may now be questionable.
Under the access and control test, primary emphasis is placed
on the consenting party's relationship to the place searched rather
17. See Henry v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 48, 175 S.E.2d 416 (1970),
where a gratuitous bailee could validly consent to a search of a motor vehicle
even though the search was directed at a passenger in the car who was
present at the time.
18. See Berner supra note 15, at 548.
19. People v. Nunn, 55 Ill. 2d 344, 304 N.E.2d 81 (1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 904 (1973).
20. State v. Kinderman, 271 Minn. 405, 136 N.W.2d 577 (1965) (the
superior property interest test); Waters v. United States, 311 A.2d 835
(D.D.C. 1973) (discussing the in loco parentis test).
21. 94 S. Ct. 988 (1974). In Matloek, the defendant was arrested and
placed in a police car in front of the house where he was residing. The
police then asked the women with whom he was living if she would consent
to a search of Matlock's room. The ensuing search uncovered evidence used to
convict the defendant.
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than on the actual consent of the ultimate defendant or even the
relationship between the two.2 2 If the consenting person actually
has common authority" over, or control of, the premises searched,
the search is valid. Any items seized may then be used as evi-
dence against any co-occupant in a subsequent criminal action.2 4
For example, Jones and Smith are co-tenants of a one-bedroom
apartment. Both freely use every room in the apartment, includ-
ing all closets and storage areas. If the police sought to make a
consent search of the apartment, either Jones' or Smith's con-
sent would be sufficient to validate the search. Using the access
and control test, each tenant's complete and unrestricted author-
ity over the premises enables him to consent to a search of the
entire area, the results of which will be binding on the non-con-
senting co-tenant.
THE AFTERMATH OF MATLOCK-PROBLEMS LEFT UNSOLVED
To the extent the Supreme Court has adopted one test over
all others, the Matlock decision provides some clarity in an other-
wise confusing area of constitutional law. However, the case
leaves several major problems unsolved.
The first problem is whether the consenting party, absent
any express authority given him by the ultimate defendant, may
waive that defendant's fourth amendment rights. Prior to Mat-
lock, Supreme Court decisions had suggested that absent an ex-
press agreement between the consenting party and the ultimate
defendant, no such waiver would be permissible.2 5 This position
was the Court's response to lower courts' attempts to validate
warrantless searches of hotel and boarding house rooms by ra-
tionalizing that the proprietor of the premises could consent to
the search by virtue of his relationship to the tenant, i.e., the
proprietor was held to be acting as an agent for the tenant.2 6
Calling the lower court's rationale "strained applications of the
22. See Berner supra note 15, at 548-49.
23. "Common authority" is not derived from mere property interests but
from "mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access
or control for most purposes, so that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to
permit the inspection in his own right ... " United States v. Matlock, 94
S. Ct. 988, 993 n.7 (1974).
24. Id. at 993.
25. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 488 (1964); Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257, 266-67 (1960); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48
(1951) ; Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
26. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
1976]
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law of agency" ' and "unrealistic doctrines of apparent author-
ity," the Court in Stoner rejected such a means for validating
consent searches. Holdings such as Stoner seemed to indicate
that third-party consent was, in fact, a waiver of another's con-
stitutional rights. In Stoner, the Supreme Court demonstrated
that it would not permit fourth amendment rights to be circum-
vented under the guise of the legal fictions of the agency test."
Matlock has apparently renewed the question of waiver:
This Court left open ... the question whether [a] wife's
permission to search the residence in which she lived
with her husband could "waive his constitutional rights,"
but more recent authority here clearly indicates that the
consent of one who possesses common authority over
premises or effects is valid as against the absent, non-
consenting person with whom that authority is shared."
By simply adopting the access and control test for validating
third-party consent searches without providing any attendant
safeguards, the Court may well have created, through the use of
27. Id. at 488.
28. Id.
29. To validate the consent search, the Court in Stoner used the fictions
of agency and apparent authority to make it appear as though the defendant
himself had actually consented to the search. Some writers believe that the
use of fictions in the law is necessary because it brings about a desired
result without making the law appear to be constantly changing. Thus, fic-
tions add the appearance of stability to the law while at the same time
achieving equitable results. H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 23-27 (3d Amer. ed.
1888); 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 1553 (W. Jones ed. 1916) (fictions
of law are always founded in equity). But in the area of search and seizure, the
past fifty years demonstrates that there is no appearance of stability to
maintain. The Court has continually recognized individual rights and has
consistently created safeguards to preserve those rights. See notes 3-5 supra.
In addition, equitable results are not achieved in the search and seizure con-
text when fictions of law are used to circumvent the ultimate defendant's fourth
amendment right to privacy. Accordingly, when fictions are used to deprive
an individual of guaranteed rights, as in Stoner, these fictions of law must
be viewed with the contempt shown for them by Jeremy Bentham when he
wrote:
What you have been doing by the fiction- could you, or could you
not, have done it without the fiction? If not, your fiction is a wicked
lie. If yes, a foolish one. Such is the dilemma. Lawyer! escape from
it if you can.
7 J. BENTHAM WORKS 283 (1843).
30. United States v. Matlock, 94 S. Ct. 988, 993 (1974).
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this test, a new fiction that will offset the good which resulted
from the rejection of the fictions in Stoner.
The new fiction stems from the underpinnings of the access
and control test and can best be illustrated through the use of a
simple hypothetical situation: Assume police officers suspect
Jones of possessing contraband in his home. They know their
suspicions do not rise to the level needed to establish probable
cause, and therefore, they know they cannot obtain a search war-
rant. However, they also believe that Jones' roommate, Smith,
knows nothing about Jones' suspected illegal activity. In Jones'
absence the police ask Smith if he would consent to a search of
the house. He gives his consent and the police enter and search
the premises. In this hypothetical example, clearly Jones is the
suspect at whom the search is directed. Assuming Smith has
common authority over the premises, his consent creates a valid
search; and any articles seized may be used as evidence against
Jones." The access and control test holds that such a search is
valid because Smith could waive his own right to fourth amend-
ment protections.2 It is therefore only coincidental that his room-
mate, who was the suspect against whom the search was directed,
was also affected by Smith's waiver of his own rights. The third-
party consent search is held valid because the search was of the
consenting person's premises, and not the nonconsenting suspect's
premises. Obviously, when the search is said to be directed at
one other than the suspect but is nevertheless made for the pur-
pose of obtaining evidence to be used against him, a fiction has
been employed. In reality, what has taken place is that one party
has been permitted to waive the fourth amendment right to pri-
vacy of both co-occupants, the very result which the Court tried
to avoid by rejecting the fictions employed by the lower courts
in Stoner.
The second problem is whether a third-party consent search
is place or person-oriented. This problem arises when the suspect
is in police custody or is otherwise available to the police for ques-
tioning. The access and control test is founded upon the consent-
ing party's relationship to the place searched,3 and therefore
31. This assumes no violation of other search and seizure safeguards, i.e.,
consent being involuntary. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 904 (1973).
32. People v. Nunn, 55 Ill. 2d 344, 304 N.E.2d 81 (1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 904 (1973).
33. See United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69, 74 (7th Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 935 (1954) (validity of consent turns on consenting person's
right to use or occupancy of premises) (emphasis added). See also United
1976]
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seems to be place-oriented. " The problem that arises when one
emphasizes place under the access and control test is that the
fourth amendment speaks of a personal right protecting people,
not places. 5
The access and control test's emphasis on place subjects that
test to abuse by officials who intentionally seek a third party's
consent at a certain time because of the absence of the suspect.
The test, as it presently exists, permits such tactics even though
they clearly run counter to the spirit of consent searches." Addi-
tionally, the test also allows police to circumvent the policy
against allowing a search without a warrant where one co-occu-
pant consents to a search and the other co-occupant refuses.3 '
The seriousness of this second problem is compounded where
suspicion has focused on a person who is available to the police.
Since the access and control test only inquires into the relationship
of the consenting person to the place searched, permission to
search may be granted in cases where it otherwise would have
been denied had the suspect himself been asked to consent to the
search. Permission or refusal to search may turn on the fortuitous
presence or absence of the ultimate defendant, a result the
Supreme Court has tried to avoid whenever constitutional rights
are at stake. 8 These types of situations demonstrate the need
for safeguards in the application of the access and control test.
States v. Stone, 471 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931
(1973); United States v. Wixom, 441 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1971).
34. See Berner supra note 15, at 548-49.
35. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). But note Mr.
Justice Harlan's analysis of the issue:
[T]he question, however, is what protection it [the fourth amend-
ment] affords to those people. Generally, as here, the answer to that
question requires reference to a "place."
Id. at 361 (concurring opinion).
36. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), wherein the
Court stated:
Consent searches are part of the standard investigating technique of
law enforcement agencies. They normally occur on the highway, or
in a person's home or office, and under informal and unstructured
conditions. The circumstances that prompt the initial request to
search may develop quickly or be a logical extension of investigative
police questioning.
Id. at 231-32.
37. See Carlton v. United States, 391 F.2d 684, 686 n.4 (8th Cir. 1968);
Lucero v. Donovan, 354 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1966); Tompkins v. Superior
Court, 59 Cal. 2d 65, 378 P.2d 113, 27 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1963).
38. The Supreme Court has consistently placed the need for constitu-
tional protections above subtleties and distinctions that would deprive persons
[Vol. 10
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A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO THE MATLOCK PROBLEMS
When suspicion focuses upon a particular person, and
that person is in police custody or is otherwise available
to the police for questioning, a warrantless search is
valid only if it is the suspect who provides the consent
for that search.
As originally stated, the purpose of this paper is to demon-
strate measures aimed at providing adequate safeguards to fourth
amendment rights in the situation where a suspect is available
for questioning. Since the Supreme Court has expressly rejected
the necessity for a specific disclosure of one's fourth amendment
rights prior to a consent search,3 ' the proposed test represents a
workable compromise to the hard and fast rule of specific dis-
closure. The triggering device of this proposal is that suspicion
has focused on a particular person. It is the same type of standard
used in police interrogation and grand jury investigation situa-
tions to determine at what point the Miranda40 warning must
be given. The focus of suspicion test arises, according to the
Supreme Court, when "the investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect,"4 ' and "when the process shifts from in-
vestigatory to accusatory. . . ."'I Exactly when the focus of
suspicion is reached is a question few courts have endeavored
to answer. Generally, that focus point is determined on a case
by case basis through inquiry into the conduct of the investigating
officers. For example, one court determined when suspicion had
of those rights. For example, where the standing necessary to challenge the
admissibility of evidence seized in a warrantless search turned on whether the
defendant was a lessee, licensee, invitee, or guest, the Court rejected such
fortuitous distinctions and said that such distinctions "ought not to be de-
terminative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to constitutional
safeguards." Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1959). A fortiori,
the fortuitous presence or absence of the ultimate defendant should not
determine his right to constitutional protections.
39. It has been suggested that a type of Miranda warning be given
prior to consent searches of any kind, third-party or otherwise. United
States v. Nikrasch, 367 F.2d 74 (7th Cir. 1966) (dictum). The warning would
consist of a statement to the effect that consent to search the premises may
be withheld and that the party has the right to deny police access to the
premises unless they have a search warrant. The Supreme Court has recently
rejected this suggestion in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 231-34
(1972), on the grounds that such a warning would be too impractical in the
normal consent search setting.
40. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
41. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
42. Id. at 492
1976]
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focused on a particular suspect in a murder case by the following
reasoning:
[It] is apparent that while hospitalized D'Nicuola had
become the focus of an investigation. . . . Although at
the time of the hospital interview the police were unaware
of Thomas Effting's death, they definitely knew that
Effting was missing and that he and D'Nicuola had not
kept a previously scheduled appointment. Being aware
of these circumstances and having found a recently fired
revolver in D'Nicuola's automobile, it is naive to assume
that when the police came to the hospital to question the
appellant they were merely following up on an attempted
suicide. This point is further substantiated by the fact
that the first specific questions asked by the police con-
cerned the ownership of the weapon."3
In grand jury investigations, the point at which the person
testifying is entitled to the constitutional safeguards of the Mir-
anda warning is described by a number of names: when the
witness becomes the "target of the investigation,"" when he
becomes the "putative defendant," 5 or the person upon whom
"the investigation has begun to focus,""6 or the "prospective" or
"de facto" defendant. ' Whether the witness has acquired such a
status is again a question of fact to be determined from the conduct
of the investigating authorities."8 When suspicion has focused
on an individual as the possible perpetrator of a crime, and a
consent search is sought, the safeguard proposed would require
the police to seek the consent of the party they suspect of the
crime.""
The proposed safeguard to fourth amendment rights will only
come into play when the police know, or have reason to know
43. Commonwealth v. D'Nicuola, 448 Pa. 54, 202 A.2d 333, 335 (1972).
44. People v. Ianniello, 21 N.Y.2d 418, 420, 235 N.E.2d 439, 441, 288
N.Y.S.2d 462, 465 (1968).
45. United States v. Matlock, 94 S. Ct. 988, 991 (1974).
46. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
47. Y. KAMiSAR, W. LAFAVE, AND J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE 946 (4th ed. 1974).
48. See United States v. Frucktman, 282 F. Supp. 534 (N.D. Ohio 1968);
State v. Sibilia, 88 N.J.Super. 546, 212 A.2d 869 (1965).
49. It is important to note that exigent circumstances may still be the
controlling factors in certain cases. For example, where the suspect is ar-
rested in or near the premises, and the police believe that evidence may be
destroyed within the house by a confederate, a search may be made without
the consent of the arrestee. Vale v. Louisiana, 39 U.S. 30 (1970).
[Vol. 10
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through reasonable efforts, the whereabouts of the suspect, or
have the suspect in custody, or under arrest. In these situations,
absent exigent circumstances," there is no valid reason for allow-
ing the police to direct to a third person their request to search
for evidence which will be used against the suspect. The follow-
ing situations are examples demonstrating the use and results
of using the proposed constitutional safeguard. Each of the
following three examples assumes that Jones and Smith are co-
occupants, and that each has access and control over the entire
premises.
(1) The police suspect Jones of committing a criminal
offense, but get Smith's consent to search the premises, when
Jones was, in fact, available to them. Any items seized during
such a search would be inadmissible as evidence against either
Jones or Smith. This result rests on the police's failure to meet
the threshold requirement necessary to validate a consent search.
That requirement, of course, is the consent of the person upon
whom suspicion had focused. Any items seized from such a search
would therefore be subject to the exclusionary rule.'
(2) The police suspect Jones, when Smith has actually
committed the crime. Jones is available to the police, but the
police use Smith's consent to conduct a search. Evidence is found
incriminating Smith. In this example, the evidence may be used
against Smith. This result harmonizes with the rationale under-
lying consent searches, because Smith waived his own personal
right to fourth amendment protections. The police do not have
to meet the threshold requirement of obtaining the consent of
the person upon whom suspicion had focused unless they seek
to use that evidence against the absent, nonconsenting suspect.
Evidence gathered against Smith is admissible because he gave
his consent to the search that produced the evidence, and is pre-
cluded from later withdrawing that consent. And since the evidence
is not being used against Jones, he has no standing to suppress
the evidence by arguing that the threshold requirement was
not met.
50. Circumstances such as actual fear that the evidence will be destroyed,
or fear for one's own safety or the safety of another would justify a war-
rantless search without first obtaining consent.
51. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
52. The issue of standing to contest searches is discussed in Brown v.
United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.
165 (1969); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
1976]
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(3) The police suspect Jones of committing a crime and
obtain his consent to search the area. They find evidence in-
criminating both Jones and Smith. Here, the evidence is admissible
against both Jones and Smith. By seeking the consent of the
person upon whom suspicion had focused, the police met the
threshold requirement proposed by this safeguard. The items
seized are admissible against Smith under the general theory that if
evidence is constitutionally seized, it may be used against any
person." Since Smith never gave his consent to the request for
a search, an argument might be made that the items seized should
be excluded as evidence against him. However, this argument
must be rejected. The purpose of the proposed safeguard is not
to emasculate consent searches, or erode the access and control
test, but to prevent possible abuse of consent searches by law
enforcement officials. Where such abuse is clearly absent, as
where the threshold requirement is met, the evidence held to
be constitutionally seized is admissible against any defendant.'*
As the previous examples demonstrate, the proposed safeguard
does away with the need for the fictions thought necessary to
validate consent searches. The proposed safeguard also does away
with the problem of fortuity. Whether the suspect is present
or absent when the police would initially like to make a consent
search is not important, since they must seek the consent of the
suspect."
Expediency suggests that the police need not turn every
stone to find the suspect in complying with the proposed test
when there is no focus of suspicion on any one person, or when
the suspect purposefully makes himself unavailable for police
53. In Skally v. United States, 347 U.S. 935 (1954), the Court expressed
the rule that where two persons have equal rights to the use or occupation
of premises, either may give consent to a search, and the evidence seized may be
used against either occupant. This rule was reaffirmed in United States
v. Matlock, 94 S. Ct. 988, 992 n.4 (1974).
54. This would also be the result where police suspect both Jones and
Smith of having committed a crime, but only obtain Jones' consent to search,
even though Smith was also available to the police. Any items subsequently
found and seized which incriminate Jones, Smith or both are admissible into
evidence.
55. Naturally, if the suspect is in police custody, the consent must be
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently given for there to be a valid waiver
of his fourth amendment rights. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973). While at least one court, Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649 (D.C.
Cir. 1951), held that a suspect in police custody could never give such a
voluntary consent due to the inherently coercive nature of custody, the
Supreme Court's decision in Schneckloth is contra.
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questioning. 6 The "focus of suspicion" test is not an inflexible
test that must be met in every situation. To make such a demand
on law enforcement officers would be both unrealistic and unreason-
able. Whether there was compliance with the proposed safeguard
would be a matter for the trial judge to decide at the suppression
of evidence hearing. The officers who conducted the search in
question would be required at the hearing to explain to an im-
partial judicial officer exactly what procedures were followed.
The judge would consider the efforts made by the police to locate
the suspect, along with any special circumstances that may have
necessitated an immediate search. Perhaps in its simplest form,
the test could be administered by asking two questions: (1) "Did
the defendant give his consent?" and (2) "if the defendant did
not give his consent, why didn't he?" A finding that the officers
did not comply with the proposed safeguard measures would
subject the evidence gathered to the exclusionary rule. In cases
where some doubt exists as to the truth of the facts as reported
by the police, a determination as to whether the proposed safe-
guard was observed could be made by applying the same tests
used to determine "timed arrests" '57 and "pretext arrests."58
One criticism of any type of requirement designed to protect
constitutional rights is that it simultaneously hinders law en-
forcement techniques."' In the present case that criticism is
valid. Consent searches would require more police effort than
has been necessary in the past. Third-party consent searches would
be more difficult to validate using the proposed safeguard than
56. Wade v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 278 F. Supp. 904 (D. Md.
1968), involved a suspect who fled from police pursuit, leaving behind a wife
and child. Under the proposed "focus of suspicion" test, the wife's subsequent
consent to search the automobile and apartment would be sufficient to validate
the search even though suspicion had clearly focused on a suspect. This re-
sult is justified because it was the suspect himself who made it impracticable
for his consent to be obtained.
57. For there to be a "timed arrest," two things must coalesce. First, the
police must have clearly disregarded the opportunity for an earlier arrest;
and second, it must be clear that the sole purpose of the police in not making
an earlier arrest was to make a more fruitful search later. Chimel v. Cali-
fornia, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
58. If a court believes that the arrest which produced the ability for
the police to search incident to the arrest (a search either of the immediate
area in control of the arrestee, or a plain-view search) was a pretext, i.e.,
one that police would not have made absent their suspicions of a crime other
than the one on which the arrest was based, then the search incident to that
arrest will be held invalid. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
59. See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1963) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
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by using the access and control test alone. Use of the proposed
safeguard, however, is not unreasonable. The fourth amendment
itself was designed to hinder unfettered invasions of privacy
by the state. 0 The consent search conducted without a warrant
and without a showing of probable cause before a neutral magis-
trate provides that kind of invasion most intrusive and most
subject to abuse. When the result of permitting such an invasion
is to forfeit effectively one's constitutional rights, a hindrance
to police investigations such as the "focus of suspicion" safeguard
proposed here is not only justified, but mandated.
CONCLUSION
Former Chief Judge Swygert, dissenting in a case in which the
seventh circuit upheld the validity of a third-party consent search,
stated that the issue in such searches was:
Are the police to be deprived of the benefits of a consent
search of a shared premises when the only party who
could effectively waive his fourth amendment rights to
privacy, and who might do so if asked, is absent from
those premises?"1
So framed, the question points out the fortuity of the present
access and control test, and the seriousness of its application
without safeguards. The grant or denial of consent may well
turn on the absence or presence of the ultimate defendant, and
its application may well result in the forfeiture of the ultimate
defendant's fourth amendment right to privacy. The Supreme
Court has consistently rejected fictitious and fortuitous methods
of by passing constitutional rights,62 and should do so with the
60. United States v. Matlock, 94 S. Ct. 988, 998 n.1 (1974) (Douglas,
J., dissenting opinion).
61. United States v. Stone, 471 F.2d 170, 177 (7th Cir. 1972) (dis-
senting opinion). Chief Judge Swygert went on to say:
I suggest that the answer lies in the reasonableness of this kind of
search, considering all the attendant circumstances. The exigencies
of the situation, the relationship of the parties, the whereabouts of
the absent party, and the reasons for his absence are all relevant
factors.
Id. at 177.
62. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), where the Court
stated:
We have recognized that the principal object of the Fourth Amend-
ment is the protection of privacy rather than property, and have in-
creasingly discarded fictional and procedural barriers rested on
property concepts.
Id. at 304.
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access and control test. The proposal introduced here guards
against abuses of this property-based test by preventing a for-
feiture of one's rights by a person other than the party whose
rights are at stake. To prevent such abuses has been the goal
of the Court in the past. Requiring the consent of the suspect
under the proposed safeguard would achieve that goal in the
future.
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